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1/ Theories and definitions
Abstract: This is part 1 of 6 of the dossier What Do We Talk about when We Talk about Queer 
Death?, edited by M. Petricola. The contributions collected in this article sit at the crossroads be-
tween thanatology and queer theory and tackle questions such as: how can we define queer death 
studies as a research field? How can queer death studies problematize and rethink the life-death 
binary? Which notions and hermeneutic tools could be borrowed from other disciplines in order 
to better define queer death studies?
The present article includes the following contributions: – MacCormack P., What does queer 
death studies mean?; – Radomska M., On queering death studies; – Lykke N., Death as vibrancy; 
– Hillerup Hansen I., What concreteness will do to resolve the uncertain; – Olson P., Queer ob-
jectivity as a response to denials of death; – Manganas N., The queer lack of a chthonic instinct.
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What does queer death studies mean?
To ask this question offers two immediate options, which will in turn, lead 
to a conservative outcome, or a proliferative force of trajectories unknown. 
We can think of queer death studies as oppositional – to straight life studies. 
We can think of queer death studies as something otherwise, as a tantalis-
ing encounter with outside. Outside the anthropocene. Outside normativity. 
Outside where death already dwells, beyond language beyond signification, 
incandescently fleshy and material nonetheless. Here is another false binary. 
For the matter (in every sense) of queer death studies is both. Striving, in 
activism, in philosophy, in art, to join the elite exclusory hegemony of 
straight being equated with life is a practice toward which many difference 
movements seemed compelled within anthropocentrism. The anthropocene 
has rarely privileged humans so much as certain kinds of humans. So count-
ing means counting as those kinds, equivalence counting over additional 
qualities. If queers want to count we usually have to ‘pass’. All our lives we 
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pass or don’t pass. We count as lives or don’t count contingent on our pass-
ability. The dying, the never really counted as life-worthy, already queer, 
and the queer not valid human life, not willing or able to straighten up to 
reproduce in order to perpetuate the earth and nonhuman genocide every 
human generation perpetrates. None of us have belonged to human life. 
So within anthropocentrism were we ever alive? Were we already dead? 
Is that what draws us to the worlds of vampires, the undead, zombies with 
their colonialist insinuations, werewolves howling in packs and refusing 
to de-hirsute, hairy chested feminists and gendermorphous wrong-kinds, 
wrongkins, occupying unnatural positions within constellations of desiring 
flows that exceed, deny any positional, hierarchical stratification of sub-
jects? Our unnatural nature belongs to nature, as anthropocentrism belongs 
to society. Anthropocentrism’s repudiation of nature makes its occupation 
define ‘life’ as something highly synthetic, synthesising master signifying 
systems with enamourment of power, flesh an inconvenience that allows 
the not-counted to suffer and die, or to be exploited as flesh alone, labour, 
consumed in any variety of ways. If we don’t live anthropocentrically, we 
live queer. If we live queer we never counted. So we are alive differently. 
To trauma, to mourning, for every manifestation of life in spite and wilful 
ignorance of its strata and subject. But also to fabulated monsters, ahuman 
perpetual becomings, desiring pulsations. Queer death studies are the resis-
tances of creativity against anthropocentric definitions of life. Embracing 
precarity, treacherous to the dominant value of the dominant being. Trai-
tors to humans. Not wanting to count within those parameters and never 
having done so anyway. We queer death studies activists were never alive 
but lived anyway. We were never not queer no matter how we tried to 
‘norm up’. Queer death time is the time of the mesh of nature and life in its 
infinite combinations succeeding the anthropocene. We deny the primacy 
of human exceptionalism and its reproductive compulsions. The thriving 
and flourishing of non-anthropocentric life, and the radical compassion of 
death activism that sees nurturing art in care are central. We don’t covet 
your life, power performing as normalcy. We seek grace in existence and 
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On queering death studies
What does “queer death” mean in “queer death studies” (QDS) is in fact a 
question that immediately requires rephrasing: what does the queering of 
death in queer death studies mean? And why to talk about queering death 
here and now? In the second half of the twentieth century, it became increas-
ingly clear that the manufacturing of death had reached unprecedented plan-
etary scales: colonial genocides and postcolonial violence; two world wars; 
the Cold War with its lingering spectre of threat from nuclear winter and 
radioactive waste; and the recognised since the 1970s ongoing environmen-
tal disruption, manifested in the annihilation of ecosystems and landscapes, 
extraction of resources, and turning of certain habitats into unliveable spaces 
for both nonhumans and humans alike (Radomska, Mehrabi & Lykke 2020). 
Furthermore, culturally speaking, some deaths are not even recognised 
as deaths in the first place. As philosopher Patricia MacCormack writes:
Where even statistics only occur on abolitionist pages because most humans do 
not see death of the nonhuman as death; Where female death, racially motivated 
death, disabled death, LGBTQ death still do not seem to register as their own 
nations; Where the anthropocentric ego is a single point of perception of the 
world for an individual to get through and thrive and the Earth as a series of 
relations will always come second to individual survival, be it as excessive or as 
daily struggle. (2020: 109)
It is thus both crucial and urgent to zoom in on global as much as local 
mechanisms of necropolitics (Mbembe 2003) that exert their power over 
the lives and deaths of human and more-than-human populations, making 
some deaths more grievable than others (Butler 2004). 
Against this background, QDS calls for a rethinking of death, dying and 
mourning in their ontological, ethical and political terms, attuned to the 
present and whilst doing away with the perpetuation of “the epistemolog-
ical and symbolic violence (with their practical, real-life consequences) of 
dismissing some deaths as not ‘worth enough’, not grievable enough, not 
even seen as ‘deaths’ in the full sense of the word” (Radomska, Mehrabi & 
Lykke 2020: 82). In other words, queering death means striving to approach 
it in unceasingly norm-critical ways, where “queering” operates as a verb 
and an adverb, pointing towards a process and a methodology of question-
ing certainties and consistently disturbing the familiar, undoing ‘normative 
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entanglements and fashion[ing] alternative imaginaries’ (Giffney & Hird 
2008: 6) beyond the exclusive concern with gender and sexuality. 
What follows, QDS is characterised by three major aspects that distin-
guish it from more conventional death-focused research: (1) its concern with 
necropolitics and necropowers, that is, the mechanisms of letting certain 
populations die through the instrumentalisation of ‘human existence and 
the material destruction of human bodies and populations’ characteristic of 
modernity (Mbembe 2003: 14); (2) its focus on the planetary-scale mechanisms 
of annihilation of the more-than-human in their ontological, epistemological 
and, most importantly, ethico-political dimensions; and (3) it critique of nor-
mative and exclusionary notions of the human subject, understood along the 
lines of a series of dichotomous divides characterising modernity (human/
nonhuman; cis-/hetero-normative/queered other; ‘civilised’/’savage’; etc.), 
which are prevalent in more traditional approaches to research on death, 
dying and mourning. In this way, QDS also draws on more and less kindred 
fields of research: post- and decolonial studies, critical race studies, feminist 
posthumanities and environmental humanities, critical animal studies, queer 
studies, feminist studies, critical disability studies, to name a few. 
By doing so, QDS mobilises three critical-theoretical entangled and 
entangling moves: decolonising, posthumanising and queering (Lykke in 
this special issue; Lykke forthcoming 2022). The decolonising move encom-
passes both the undoing of necropolitics of post/colonial violence combined 
with capitalist extractivism, and turning towards pluritopic hermeneutics 
(Tlostanova & Mignolo 2009). In doing so, decolonising death means 
refusing to follow the path of Western universalisms and instead engaging 
with the situated knowledge-seeking practices of indigenous philosophies 
and cosmologies, which shift towards different, critical-affirmative under-
standings of death. 
The posthumanising move refers to systematic critique and dismantling 
of the planetary-scale machinery of annihilation of the more-than-human 
world in its ontological, epistemological and ethico-political magnitude. It 
encompasses critical analyses of the human/nonhuman divide and power 
differentials that have allowed for the reduction of the nonhuman to mere 
resource and instrument for human actions. In consequence, posthuman-
ising death involves problematising philosophical and cultural meanings 
of extinction (cf. Rose 2012); focusing on environmental violence, envi-
ronmental grief, and nonhuman death manufactured en masse through 
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anthropocentric habits of consumption and extractivist destruction. Fur-
thermore, it entails taking seriously the issues of responsibility, account-
ability and care for/in dying more-than-human worlds, while remaining 
grounded in radical critiques of human exceptionalism (Haraway 2008). 
One way to mobilise posthumanising death is by way of deterritorialisa-
tion (Deleuze & Guattari 2004), where our understanding of death is 
no longer anchored in a value ascribed to the human subject, but instead 
moves towards “the multiplex, intra- and interacting ecologies of the non/
living” (Radomska 2020: 131), characterised by “strange new becomings, 
new polyvocalities” (Deleuze & Guattari 2004: 211). 
Finally, the queering move of QDS refers to both (1) open-ended decon-
struction of normativities in their various incarnations (e.g. Chen 2012), and 
(2) deconstructing and abolishing of heteropatriarchy, heteronormativity, 
binary gender and sexuality systems, governed by reproductive biopowers 
and reproductive futurism (e.g. Edelman 2008). Consequently, queering 
death in QDS ranges from unpacking and problematising modern Western 
ontologies of death and the life/death binary, grounded in Western philo-
sophical and theological dualisms, to the critical analyses of the ways in 
which misogyny, trans- and queerphobia lead to ‘social death’, and how 
violence towards non-normative individuals strives to mark their lives and 
deaths as ‘non-grievable’ (Radomska and Lykke forthcoming). 
In sum, through its three-partite analytics, QDS provides theoretical, 
methodological and ethico-political frameworks that are both crucial and 
necessary if, in a systematic manner, we are to analyse, critique and resist 
the entangled structures of global necropolitics – further amplified by the 
ongoing environmental, socio-economic and geo-political crises – and the 
accompanying systems of oppression: racism, sexism, speciesism, classism, 
and ableism, to name a few. Perhaps, if we follow this analytical path, it will 
open for us a critical and creative space for ontological and ethical reflec-
tion and different kinds of narratives in the times of global environmen-
tal disruption, violence and injustice, when ‘our common present always 
exists in the wake of a complicated past, and ahead, to a common future 
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Death as vibrancy 
From the beginning, queer theory has articulated the terms, queer/queer-
ing, as open-ended and fluid categories. Therefore, I do not opt for only one 
fixed way of talking about queering death. I define queer/queering, prefer-
ably to be used in its processual verbform, as terms which, first of all, refer 
to a general undoing of all kinds of norms, normativities and underlying 
structures. However, I also see such a definition as but one instant within 
a multiple spectrum, in which another instant is made up of meanings 
specifically related to the undoing of heteropatriarchy, heteronormativity, 
and the gender binary. For me, queer/queering death at the latter end of 
the spectrum of meanings implies a situating and specifying of the gene-
alogies of my embodied, queerfeminine desires. In this instant, I explore 
my urge to queer death, and the ways in which it is personally grounded 
in my queerfeminine desires to reconnect with my passed away beloved 
queermasculine, lesbian life partner. I take these queerfeminine desires as a 
queer-femme-inist (Dahl 2012) point of departure for my political, theoret-
ical and ethical work to queer death. In sum, my work to queer death scales 
(zoom in/out) (Jain & Stacey 2015; Lykke 2019a) between a personal point 
of departure and over-arching ethico-political perspectives. 
In my forthcoming book Vibrant Death. A Posthuman Phenomenology 
of Mourning (Lykke 2022), I follow this scaling practice insofar as I build 
an ethico-political figuration of death as vibrant from the personal story 
of my queerfeminine desires to reconnect with my passed away partner, 
now turned to ashes mixed with sand in a seabed built of algae (species: 
diatoms) 55 mio years ago. Diatoms are queer critters. They defy categori-
zations as either plants or animals (Allen et al. 2011). They are also old and 
wise. They have been around on the Earth for around 150 million years, 
and living diatoms are still today filling the waters of the planet, including 
the waters, where my beloved’s ashes are scattered. Diatoms belong to the 
species of phytoplankton, which, like terrestrial plants, contains chloro-
phyll, transforms light to chemical energy through photosynthesis, and 
produces oxygen. Living diatoms are today reported annually to generate 
about 20% of the planet’s oxygen. In 2011 it was discovered that diatoms, 
earlier considered plant-like due to their ability to photosynthesize, also 
have an urea cycle making them able to excrete nitrogen and metabolize 
in ways which, until then, were assumed to characterize only animals 
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and animal-like creatures (Allen et al. 2011). An alien, non-human, but 
very vibrant and queer world, abounding with living and fossilized dia-
toms, makes up the watery assemblages of which my beloved’s ashes have 
become part (Lykke 2019b). Symphysizing (i.e. bodily empathizing, Lykke 
2018) with my beloved’s non-human remains and the waters where the 
ashes are scattered, I explore my position of excessive mourner to contem-
plate the concepts of life/death and human/non-human, taking lessons to 
reontologize them. Reflecting on this world, and trying to co-become with 
it, brought me to end my book (Lykke 2022) with a queering question: 
What if every critter’s death was vibrant?
Implied in this question, is the argument that life/death and human/
non-human should be seen as continuous, and not as dichotomously sepa-
rated. I ground this argument in an immanence philosophical, vitalist mate-
rialist and spiritualist materialist framework (Bennett 2010; Braidotti 
2006, 2013; Anzaldua 2015). I argue that life and death have been made 
into opposites by Western modernity, in its entanglement with Christianity 
and Cartesianism, and their celebration of destructive linear thought and 
contempt for flesh and matter, human as well as non-human. Therefore, 
queer/queering death means for me to approach death radically differently, 
i.e. to understand death as part of a life-death continuum, and to work from 
embodied desires to spiritually materially recognize and honour the ways 
in which decomposing and growing are totally entangled in each other 
– what feminist biophilosopher Marietta Radomska (2020) articulated as 
matter’s being in a state of non/living. Rethinking death like this means to 
unlearn the epistemic habits of the sovereign human subject (often mate-
rializing in white, heteropatriarchally acting bodies who pursue (their 
own) immortality, while arrogantly sustaining norms and structures which 
make most other categories of bodies exploitable and disposable). Instead 
we should learn to understand ourselves as part of an egalitarian planetary 
kinship of vulnerable and mortal bodies, human and non-human, organic 
and inorganic, animate and inanimate. 
 Along these over-arching lines, I find it crucial to intersectionally com-
bine queering with posthumanizing and decolonizing (see also Radomska 
in this special issue). Decolonizing means making visible and undoing 
the necropowers and necropolitics of colonialism, capitalism, and racism, 
which haunt societies, pushing forward structurally enforced distinctions 
between disposable/non-disposable, grievable/non-grievable bodies. This 
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perspective is entangled with a posthumanizing one, insofar as disposable/
non-disposable, grievable/non-grievable bodies are to be understood not 
only within the framework of hierarchical human-human relations, but 
also against the background of a general casting of all non-human critters 
as in principle disposable, exploitable, and non-grievable. Entangling with 
decolonizing and posthumanizing efforts to undo necropolitical structures, 
queering death means making visible and critiquing not only norms and 
normativities, but also underlying structures which keep up norms and 
normativities. However, staying in a critical mode is not enough. The search 
for alternatives is crucial as well. The critique of structural and normativ-
izing aspects of capitalist, post/colonical and speciesist necropolitics, the 
arrogant making live and letting die of vast (human and non-human) pop-
ulations of disposable bodies must go hand in hand with efforts to create 
elsewhere-spaces for doing things otherwise (Lykke 2019a). My question: 
what if every critter’s death was vibrant (Lykke 2022) is critically-affirma-
tively addressing the search for such open-ended spaces and timescapes 




What concreteness will do to resolve the uncertain 
Talking about (queer) death we often find ourselves chewing through fron-
tiers put in place by conventional ideas about what life is. To illustrate, I 
will use an aspect of my own research,1 which – while with no intention to 
dismiss the importance of insights harbored in this field at large – wonders 
what happens if one reads the biomedical realization of grief as diagnosis 
as a response to something else?2 
“Complicated Grief” (CG),3 write Shear et al., “entails harmful dysfunc-
1 Hillerup Hansen forthcoming.
2 Grief was added to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) in 2018 and is awaiting 
entry into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).
3 That is, grief symptoms that do not wane or disappear after a set period of time. Here is an 
example of how “[p]rolonged and intensified acute grief” will have the bereaved show “symptoms 
of strong yearning for the person who died, frequent thoughts or images of the deceased person, 
feelings of intense loneliness or emptiness and a feeling that life without this person has no 
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tion in that a normal healing process has been derailed [… it] reflects an 
underlying psychobiological dysfunction” (2011: 3); “CG is a recognizable 
syndrome that can be reliably identified with several rating scales […]” 
(Ibid.: 4).4 
This definition signals, first, to the influence biomedicine has had on 
psychiatry broadly.5 Looking to the molecular to decipher pathology, bio-
medicine has established a causal relationship between the brain and the 
mind, making mental illness a reflection of its presumed biological basis 
(Rose 2001: 197-8).6 Secondly, in this framing of the biological as cause7 
surfaces biomedicine’s (neo)vitalist understanding of and investment in 
human life qua its organic capacity to live (Ibid.: 42).8 
Couched in this causality, the argument that predominantly follows 
grief’s rendering as pathology – namely, for the necessary, even inevita-
ble, return of the “bereaved subject” to perceived normalcy (e.g. Shear et 
al. 2013; Zisook et al. 2012) – comes to deliver a normatively framed level 
of life energy as a neutral and uncontestable (because biologically wired) 
purpose or meaning. Complications also lead to dysfunctional thoughts, maladaptive behaviours 
and emotion dysregulation such as troubling ruminations about circumstances or consequences 
of the death, persistent feelings of shock, disbelief or anger about the death, feelings of estrange-
ment from other people and changes in behaviour focused on excessive avoidance of reminders 
of the loss or the opposite, excessive proximity seeking to try and feel closer to the deceased, 
sometimes focused on wishes to die or suicidal behaviour.” (Shear et al. 2011: 3-4) See also Zisook 
et al.’s definition of ‘complicated bereavement’ (2012: 426).
4 This is a version of the general definition of grief one encounters in the research literature 
that has come out of the fields of medicine, psychiatry and public health before, but concentrat-
ing around, the removal of the ’Bereavement Exclusion’ from the 2013-edition of the DSM.
5 While Shear et al. include “behavioral” and “psychological” aspects in their definition of 
CG (2011: 3), the centrality of their exemplary alignment of “psychobiological dysfunction” with 
“brain” and “underlying biology” (Ibid.: 5) makes the dominance of, what Nikolas Rose calls, bio-
medicine’s “molecular” (2001: 215-6, 253-4) lens apparent. Rushing to aid this point is the context 
in which this alignment emerges where the treatment of, so called, “complicated grief” with 
anti-depressants has become possible with a much more pervasive push toward the use of psy-
chopharmacology to treat mental illness (Rabinow & Rose 2006; Horwitz & Wakefield 2007). 
6 In the words of Rose “mind is what brain does” (198). The term ’underlying’ should therefore 
not be read as an indication of an older or more classical understanding of the brain as this deep 
and abstract phenomenon (130; Sedgwick 1981: 255) but rather as a 1:1 relation and mechanics in 
which the biological appears to be the control room that decides what is given expression, exter-
nally, as mental ‘dys/functioning’. 
7 Thus denoting a relation of impact and the biological as engine or vehicle i.e., as that which 
sets things into motion.
8 Elaborating the quality of this investment in the context of biomedicine’s ‘molecular’ ap-
proach to the human body, Rose writes, “what is at issue is vitality at the level of the organism, 
where the very meaning and limits of life itself are subject to political contestation” (ibidem.).
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fact of human life. 9 Still, the rather impressive epistemological feat, that is 
the realization of grief as diagnosis, manages something more. For hints of 
what, one need look no further than to a queer uptake of another vitalist 
discourse. This is, Freudian psychoanalysis (or its theorizations) illustrated, 
in the context of my work, by Leo Bersani.10
Wanting more from Freud’s concept of drive than a theory of “nor-
mative sexual development” (1987: 217), Bersani picks up Freud’s vitalist 
understanding of sex drive as libidinal or life force where it gestures to 
sex’s “value of powerlessness” because denoting a “radical disintegration 
and humiliation of the self” (ibidem.).11 Approaching sexual pleasure (jou-
issance) as but one expression of life as energetic force, Bersani makes an 
afterthought of the subject who, as the case of grief’s biomedicalization 
well exemplifies, usually stands as a transcendental marker of (human) 
being in a Western tradition of philosophy and knowledge production.12 
While left rather unexplored for another urgent point about the deeply 
violent nature of the Symbolic, the space of possibility left open by (my 
reverse engineering of) Bersani’s reading of Freud holds out an intriguing 
insight.13 Namely, that life is always more than or in excess of its capture in 
human form.14 Noticeably provided by an alternative use of vitalism, this 
concept of life offers a different ontological point of departure than what 
its biomedical rendering – through the route of the subject’s return to 
9 What I mean to stress here is how a vitalist concept of life is influenced by normative ide-
ations of how life should be lived, specifically, by contemporary ideals of happiness and wellbe-
ing. See for example Cvetkovich 2012; Ahmed 2013; Shildrick 2015. 
10 Interestingly Freud appears in the biomedical literature on grief (e.g. Shear et al. 2011). Be-
cause of the general shunning of psychoanalysis from the field of biomedicine, I do tend to think 
of his function as leverage for a biomedical point – which, by the way, has nothing to do with 
his concept of mourning (and melancholia) and the argument he makes in relation to it – as an 
indication of his near-pop cultural status more than it reflects a sincere intellectual and scientific 
alliance. This intriguing juncture remains, however, one of the reasons why I find it relevant to 
bring psychoanalytic insights to bear on a contemporary biomedical discourse.
11 This is a super speedy and condensed version of a much more elaborate reading (Hillerup 
Hansen forthcoming).
12 Loyal to the theoretical environment his argument is embedded in, and also to have it host a 
dose of critical insight on the kind of violence this concept denotes, Bersani names the subject a 
“proud subjectivity” (222).
13 The space I name ontological possibility, Bersani only remarks on in passing and by reference 
to Freud’s returning speculations on sexual pleasure (217) as thresholds of intensities that have “the 
organization of the self […] momentarily disturbed by sensations or affective processes” (Ibid.).
14 For examples of different (from this and each other) routes that remark on a similar point 
about the excess of animacy and life, respectively, see Chen 2011; Alaimo 2008.
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‘normalcy’ – makes available.
Thus, Bersani points to the range a concept of vitalism traverses while 
he illustrates how life is not a neutral phenomenon. It is molded and often 
with great violence.15 Consequently, the subject begins to look more like a 
model to capture what life is/should be, which in turn leaves me speculat-
ing if the troubling yet impressive epistemological feat of bringing grief as 
diagnosis into being also holds another quality?16 
With the rendering of grief as “biological dysfunction” an abstract 
phenomenon, entailing ontological openness and existential uncertainty 
beyond what can be captured and resolved medically, is made concrete, 
physical, specific. Meaning, in describing grief in biological terms (phys-
ical) and defining it as ‘syndrome’ (specific), these reparative efforts may 
(also) be seeking to mend the blow of uncertainty loss impacts – either for 
the first time or over again – not just into a specific life but a steady (onto-
logically speaking), fixable (epistemologically speaking) world.17 
Gauged through this prism, a biomedical literature’s confident parading 
of a solution appears as a near-anxious measure of (self)protection against 
an, indeed overwhelming, ontological openness. With biomedicine serving 
as but one example, my symptomatic reading of what concreteness does 
to avert or resolve the abstract, open and uncertain, comes from a place 
of compassion toward a relatable need to repair (so as to feel safe and/or 
make things better). That said, this reading means to lean iinto the space of 
possibility highlighted above to explore what forms and modalities being 
may take (i.e. the range of existence). 
15 Variations over this critical insight may be found in black studies (e.g. Wynter 2015) as well 
as anti- and posthumanism (e.g. Braidotti 2013). 
16 Offering an, in this context, uncommon reading of the aggressions unleashed at gay men 
in particular during the early years of the US AIDS epidemic, Bersani sees in homophobia the 
‘symbolic’ itself being triggered by and surging to calm ‘excessive’ energies into a malleable form. 
Transposed to the biomedical realization of grief, to my mind, this insight has the subject appear 
as at once the result of and a formula used for the eradication of unorganized life energies, rather 
than (as is the implied position in the biomedical logic of reparation) a natural state of being at 
which reparative return is aimed.
17 Here I am pointing both to a representationalist account of reality defined by ontologically 
inherent and independently existing objects (Barad 2003) as well as to an embodied sense of 
safety with/in the world that finds support in a broad generic range, spanning from scientific 
discourse (the biomedical being but one example) to knowledge and narrative more broadly or 
commonly, such as the kind of stories we tell, so as to convince, ourselves that ‘everything will 
be OK’. Such embodied sense of safety is also very much a question of privilege and the material 
conditions in place to envelop some lives in more stability, comfort and protection than others.
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In ending, here are some avenues this reading opens, which my research 
tracks. Textures to explore the flexing and morphing modalities of being 
unfold as the affective and sensory experiences of the, so called, ‘bereaved 
subject’ who slips from and jolts out of a ‘normal’ level of life.18 So too does 
the ‘deceased’ – who, when marked as “hallucination” (e.g. Castelnovo et 
al. 2015), is altogether dismissed as nonexistent – offer site to explore the 
forms presence might take when not forced to appear in terms physical 




Queer objectivity as a response to denials of death
When I was around nine years-old I followed my dad – as I often did after 
he picked me up from school – through the basement of the family busi-
ness he co-owned with my grandpa Lyle, toward my dad’s tiny, cluttered 
office on the other side of the boiler room. The trip to his office took us 
past a penny candy machine that stood against the wall in a shared, base-
ment office space with doors to the boiler room, the casket display room, 
the service elevator, and the small, two-table “prep room”. On this day, 
Bruce, the only licensed mortician employed by my dad and grandpa, stood 
over a dead human body. “Hey Bruce!” I called, glancing through the ever-
open prep room door. (This was a work space, and the only door that was 
always closed was the one that separated this space from the lushly car-
peted, amber lit casket display room, through which “families” – my dad’s 
customers – walked to shop for caskets.) No more than a few steps into the 
18 I am by no means trying to make a positive spin on what are, arguably, difficult and taxing 
experiences related to grief (the same way arguing they are modes of resistance, vis-à-vis the 
expectations that shape neoliberal subjecthood, can have the unfortunate effect of romanticizing 
depression or other mental health struggles). What I am, however, trying to signal is a (read-
ing) ‘otherwise’ whose critical and affirmative potencies are not defined by dichotomies such as 
positive/negative, good/bad, resistance/coercion etc. As example, I am too briefly recapping my 
alternative reading of grief’s symptomatic profile – which can be found elsewhere in full length 
(Hillerup Hansen forthcoming) – as a way to reconfigure affective and sensory experiences re-
lated to grief beyond their function as diagnostic index (cf. footnote 3).
19 I am pointing to Jacques Derrida’s characterization of a metaphysics of presence, founded, he 
argues, in the verifiable “physical presence and time of the present” (1996; see also Derrida 2012).
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boiler room I stopped dead in my tracks. What did I just see? Retracing my 
path, I stood before the open prep room to survey the scene.
Wearing little more than a white apron to protect his dress shirt, tie, 
and suit pants – no gown, cap, face shield, goggles, or shoe coverings, for 
this was the late 1970s, roughly a decade before the advent of what John 
Troyer calls the “HIV/AIDS Corpse” (2020: 59) and its concomitant PPE. 
Bruce stood facing me on the opposite side of a white, ceramic table that 
tilted slightly to my right toward a sink lying far too low for comfortably 
washing hands. This sink had for decades received various bodily fluids, as 
well as some of the embalming fluids used to prepare and preserve bodies 
for viewing. At the slightly raised end of the table the head of a dead man 
sat raised on a hard plastic, rose-colored head rest. The skin was pulled 
back from the man’s open rib cage, revealing muscle, bone, and an empty 
torso. An organ donor lay on the table.
For the first time in my life, it struck me that the normalcy of human 
corpses in my daily experience was very abnormal (though I did not have 
the capacity to think it queer). The things with which I had grown so famil-
iar – dead bodies in various states of dress or undress, black body bags with 
broad, rough zippers, the smell of embalming fluids (for me inseparable 
from the fusty, chalky taste of stale penny candy), the sights and sounds 
of grieving people, hearses, the back doors and insides of nursing homes, 
hospital morgues and loading docks, cannulas, trochars, bristly pink eye 
caps, those uncomfortable-looking rose-colored head rests, collapsible cas-
ket trucks skirted in ruffled red velvet, organ music, eulogies, and flower 
arrangements heavy with lilies and gladiolas – these things were now 
emerging from the background of my childhood, and they were growing 
more powerful. I soon learned that I could wield my familiarity with the 
dead to make people feel uncomfortable and to make people laugh – often 
both at the same time. As a middle schooler, playful jokes about canni-
balism and necrophilia were the spellcraft through which I controlled the 
narratives, fantasies, and affects surrounding the mysterious source of my 
family’s livelihood. 
But the power I wielded as an adolescent was coiled in the privilege of 
a birthright: a birthright that granted access to the dead, and that permit-
ted movement through all the spaces of the funeral home. I could walk 
through walls. More literally, I could walk through ever-closed doors that 
separated the “front stage” spaces (staged for public rituals of grief and 
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consumption) from the “back stage” spaces (reserved for professional rites 
of knowing and production). Being able to see – and to touch, smell, hear, 
and taste (in penny candy, in my fingertips) – all the spaces and textures of 
the funeral home meant that, in my experience, very little was forbidden. 
Moreover, as a straight, cisgender, white, male I cannot claim to be queer 
in any unproblematic sense. There! I just came clean. (I also just got dirty 
– like “[subject] matter out of place”(Douglas 1966).) How to sort this. 
Donna Haraway teaches me here. 
Vision is always a question of the power to see – and perhaps the violence implicit 
in our visualizing practices. With whose blood [and flesh] were my eyes crafted? 
(Haraway 1988: 585)
It is perhaps a stroke of moral luck that my seeing eyes were crafted by 
a donor – by someone who (I presume) willingly gave his flesh to oth-
ers. My eyes were crafted, or, more precisely, ‘roughed-in’, by willing flesh 
and blood. But that fortunate logic only goes so far. The donor’s flesh was 
exceptionally accessible, but his body was one among hundreds that I had 
the power to see. Still, my view was not “unmarked” and “self-identical” 
(Ibid.). I saw dead flesh from a position of a funeral service insider: a norma-
tive position powered by social, legal, cultural, professional, economic, and 
material networks. The funeral-industrial complex wields potent necropo-
wer. Yet my position was (and remains) marked as deviant. I was becoming 
aware of a split through myself that mimicked the boundaries between 
the front and back stage spaces of the funeral home: a split not unlike the 
one my then-six-year-old daughter pointed to when, during our third day 
together in Santiago, Dominican Republic, she asked, “Dad, would I be me 
if I wasn’t me?” Would I be me if I had grown up differently? Would I be me 
if I had never seen dead bodies with these powerful, deviant eyes? Some-
thing opens up in the passage between “I” and “me”. George Herbert Mead 
(2015 [1934]) found “generalized others” moving through that passage. 
María Lugones (1987) found room to move, play, and love in that space. 
Donna Haraway (1988) found space for objectivity in that opening. Queer 
theorists explore a seemingly infinite source of social-creative potential in 
the passage between an “I” and “me” that are free to associate or dissociate, 
or to collaborate or contend with ever-evolving social, political, biological, 
ethical, and sexual normativities. 
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What sorts of necro-normativities and thanato-normativities will 
emerge in response to the question, “what do we talk about when we 
talk about queer death?” Is there anything special about the normativities 
surrounding death and “dead matter” (Schwartz 2015)? Or are matters 
of death and dead matter just arbitrarily bounded objects of inquiry or 
domains of action? 
In 1991, while in college, I briefly worked as a live-in night attendant 
and embalming assistant at a Fargo, North Dakota funeral home, where 
I was expected to do a wide variety of jobs, including lawn mowing, 
hearse and limousine washing, vacuuming, furniture dusting, answering 
phones, assisting with funerals and visitations, body removals (from pri-
vate homes, nursing homes, hospitals, roadsides, train stations, etc.), and 
assisting licensed embalmers with their techno-artistry. One reason I quit 
this job was because, in my employers’ eyes, each of my tasks was consid-
ered (and compensated) the same as any of the others. Yet, it seemed to me 
there were important differences between vacuuming a floor and aspirat-
ing a dead body, between washing a car and washing a corpse. After I quit 
the funeral home, I took a job as an after-hours infectious waste janitor at 
a Fargo hospital. My job, which I shared with two or three others, was to 
collect the red bags, the contents of red, plastic sharps containers, and the 
waste from the chemotherapy room. These things were not handled by the 
“regular” janitorial staff. There are different kinds of waste and different 
kinds of “cleaning up”. Here I found some recognition of the differences 
that went unmarked in the Fargo funeral home. Functions and structures 
matter.
When we talk about queer death, do we talk about a special site for 
queering? Do we talk about unique agencies and practices? Do we talk 
about hitherto underexplored and underappreciated forms of experience, 
labor, embodiment, and ways of knowing? Do we talk about whom and 
what have been excluded (and by whom and by what) from our individual 
and collective recognitions of, and encounters with, death? We talk about 
all of these things, and talking about all of these things holds forth the pos-
sibility, I want to suggest, of queer objectivity – an onto-ethic-epistem-ol-
ogy (Barad 2007) of conversation and exchange: not an objectivity that 
reduces death and the dead body to passively inert objects for collective 
conversation and analysis; not an objectivity that approaches death as a 
resource; not an objectivity that fails to privilege perspectives that warrant 
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privilege; and not an objectivity that hypostatizes disruption as the ulti-
mate guide to life, death, reality, and imagination. Rather, queer objectivity 
recognizes death as an actor – sometimes a collaborator, sometimes an 
adversary, sometimes a fellow traveler – that has its say in ever-shifting 
assemblages of humans, more-than-humans, and technologies at a variety 
of scales: individual, social, ecological, planetary. Death plays the intruder, 
whose interruptions cryonicist “immortalists” (Farman 2020) seek to 
silence. Death’s prolific production of corpses during the COVID-19 pan-
demic has taxed governments, grievers, dyers, first responders, and “last 
responders” (Rosenfeld 2021). Death marks bodies as those that may die, 
those that must die, those that may be forgotten, or those that must be 
remembered. Death isn’t impartial. And the study of death should reflect 
that fact. It makes sense for queer objectivity to privilege non-normative 
voices – especially the voices of those who challenge dominant norms of 
gender and sexuality – for it is in privileging non-normative voices that 
the contours of death’s partiality get seen and felt most clearly and most 
deeply.
It has been over thirty years since I have touched a dead human body, 
but less than ten years since I transitioned from a philosophy department 
to a Science and Technology Studies (STS) department, and, in so doing, 
discovered death studies. As a philosopher I wrote and taught about both 
epistemology (including feminist epistemology) and normative and applied 
ethics. As an STS and death studies scholar, I have translated these inter-
ests into teaching and writing about technological expertise, gender, bod-
ies, and labor with respect to the processing and disposal of dead human 
bodies. Given my background, it should come as no surprise that my STS/
death studies scholarship foregrounds questions about professionalization, 
labor, and expertise. Funeral industrialists (including funeral directors, 
embalmers, cremationists, and cemetery operators) have an interest in 
marking themselves as occupants of a distinctive social and professional 
domain – the domain of “death care”. 
There are multiple means by which funeral industrialists delimit the 
bounds of their professional jurisdiction and cultural authority over death 
care. Evoking the Weberian concepts of “status groups” and “castes”, 
Spencer Cahill (1999) shows how mortuary science students at a North 
American community college deploy their deviant familiarity with dead 
human flesh as a “mark of honor” or “nobility” (117) that sets them apart 
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from a generalized other that is in turn marked by “pathological death 
denial” (113). 
This rhetoric of death denial and public ignorance was central to these students’ 
professionalization. It transforms the stigma of their chosen occupational iden-
tity into a mark of honor: funeral directors’ familiarity with and knowledge of 
death and its aftermath set them not only apart from but above the death denying 
lay public. (Cahill 1999: 114)
Memorable appeals to a purported cultural pathology of “death denial” 
include both Ernest Becker (1973) and Philippe Ariès (1981), and the rhet-
oric of death denial remains alive and well. Proponents of the contempo-
rary, U.S. home funeral movement use the term to set themselves apart not 
only from a generalized other, but also from the normative institutions and 
practices of funeral industrialists (Olson 2016). Champions of “death pos-
itivity”, too, use death denial as a foil for their own ability and willingness 
to discuss the particularities and practicalities of death, dying, and the dis-
position of human remains (Doughty 2021). As Lyn Lofland (2019 [1978]) 
points out, death denial repeatedly gets evoked as the proper antagonist 
to higher, nobler, or more authentic relationships with death. Lofland is 
skeptical of the reality – let alone the pathological nature – of death denial, 
but, she notes, “the importance” of the rhetoric of death denial “ . . . is not 
its ‘truth’ but its utility” as a tool for challenging “the ‘conventional view 
of death’” or “the conventional wisdom about death” (73).
Queer death studies, too, can make use of death denial as a tool for 
challenging normativites that dominate death studies. Queer death studies 
can strategically deploy death denial as a point of leverage for critiquing 
powerful, partial perspectives that really do deny non-normative perspec-
tives on (and experiences of) death, dying, and the disposal of dead human 
bodies. Queer death studies can reveal the truth of death denial’s realities 
by responding to the voices and fleshes of those whose relationships with 
death have been denied. In doing so, queer death can avoid caste-ing itself 
as a status group by refusing the heroic goal of authenticity and embracing, 
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The queer lack of a chthonic instinct
Norwegian novelist Karl Ove Knausgaard opens his celebrated novel A 
Death in the Family (2009) with the observation that the sight of a corpse 
is taboo and that we as a society do the utmost to hide the dead body from 
public view. Why can’t a dead body be on display for an hour or two? Why 
must it immediately be removed or covered? He writes that it is “as though 
we possessed some kind of chthonic instinct, something deep within us 
that urges us to move death down to the earth whence we came” (2009: 7). 
The use of the word “chthonic”, derived from the Greek word khthonios 
meaning “of the earth”, is curious (Fontelieu 2010: 152). Chthonic refers 
to what lies underneath the Earth’s surface, that is, in the underworld 
(Fairbanks 1900: 242). The Greeks worshipped both Chthonic gods such 
as Hades and Persephone who flourished in darkness, as well as the Olym-
pian deities that are associated with light. But as Burckett and Marinatos 
point out, “the semiotics of light and darkness are nothing if not complex 
in Greek thought” (2010: xv). For the Greeks, light may represent life, order, 
and vision, and darkness evil, violence, and ignorance; but the line sepa-
rating the two was often blurred (Burckett & Marinatos 2010: xv). This 
is because there is a surprising duality to the term: chthonic evokes both 
abundance (light) and a state of darkness (Fontelieu 2010: 152). As Bur-
kett and Marinatos wryly intimate: “creatures of darkness … need to sur-
face or communicate their existence in the world of light” (2010: xvii). The 
chthonic deities were connected to souls and for this reason they evoked 
both dread and hope as the Greeks sought their blessings for the journey 
into the afterlife (Fairbanks 1900: 252). By worshipping chthonic deities, 
Greeks were, according to Fontelieu, “participating in a relationship with 
the projected darker parts of their own nature” (2010: 152).
In classical studies, Fontaine has traced the dualism of light and dark-
ness in the Greeks and beyond and argues that dualistic thought can be 
found in all places and at all times, suggesting that it is necessary to make 
sense of the world (1986). Succumbing to the depths of the underworld, and 
the light/dark dualism that such a descent implies, is a metaphor that has 
extended beyond classical studies and religion and into the disciplinary 
areas of psychoanalysis and literary studies. Fontelieu reads the Greek 
worship of Chthonic cults and darkness through a psychoanalytical lens 
and suggests it was liberating for the Greeks insofar as it acknowledged 
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the darker parts of human nature:
Today, rather than a reverential attitude toward the awesome power of the 
chthonic force, even in psychological systems and religions, much of this drive 
is the target for a life long battle to contain, banish, or defeat it in oneself and in 
society. Unlike the Greek chthonic cults, today darkness is not worshipped, it is 
feared. Denial of the dark side of the soul (dark did not mean evil to the chthonic 
cults, but implied an insufficiency of illumination) inevitably creates projection 
of one’s own unacknowledged urges onto others. (2010: 152)
Fontelieu’s reading of the Chthonic realm is drawn from Jungian psy-
choanalytic theory that also toys with a dualism between darkness and 
light. According to Jung: “Sexuality is of the greatest importance as the 
expression of the chthonic spirit [which] is ‘the other face of God,’ the 
dark-side of the God-Image” (1968: 168). The chthonic realm can function 
as a constructive site where Jung’s individuation process can be accom-
plished: the unification of the Self is attained by journeying towards the 
underground of human consciousness. Literary theory has adopted the 
Jungian idea that individuation is achieved through unique psychologi-
cal phases. As Kiliçarslan describes the process: “The Chthonios is where 
archetypes reside and wait to be explored through mythological descent 
into the underground (Katabasis) which begins with the persona and ends 
at the Self, the deepest layer of the psyche” (2008: 55). By descending into 
the underworld characters can “face their true identity”, revealing their 
subconscious desires and motivations as they “voyage towards self-reali-
zation” (Kiliçarslan 2008: 55-56). 
If descending into the underworld is such a fundamental part of achiev-
ing self-realization, whether in individuals or texts, it is telling that soci-
eties tend to banish darkness from plain sight. Knausgaard’s contention 
that we are possessed by “some kind of chthonic instinct … that urges us to 
move death down to the earth whence we came” (my emphasis) is there-
fore an apt metaphor to describe modernity’s quest for lightness (2009: 7). 
But the “us” in Knausgaard’s formulation not only acts as a universalizing 
totality – we are all one, we all share a chthonic instinct that makes us 
human – but also, I suggest, erases queer subjects that do not always have 
the privilege of being able to “move death down to the earth” and into 
the underworld. Here, then, lies a simple provocation: Queer subjects, as 
much as they would like to “move death down to the earth”, are continually 
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reminded that their existence unsettles and exceeds the binary between life 
and death. Or to paraphrase Burkett and Marinatos, the semiotics of light 
and darkness are nothing if not complex in queer lives (2010: xv). I am not 
referring to death here as a finality, even though for many queer subjects 
death is often final (HIV/AIDS, transphobic femicide, hangings), but rather 
as a symbol that queer subjects experience as a looming presence. Queer 
subjects, because of their very queerness, not only do not have a chthonic 
instinct but are rather defined by a lack of such an instinct. 
By saying that queers lack a chthonic instinct I am not mirroring Freud’s 
contention that “the goal of all life is death” (1922). Nor am I aligning my 
argument with Edelman’s conjecture of a politics of the death drive (though 
I share his assertion that “queerness can never define an identity, it can only 
ever disturb one”) (2004: 17). Instead, my argument is that for many queer 
subjects death is unavoidable, inescapable, impossible to “move down to 
the earth”. It is the queer subject’s apartness that makes the presence of 
death so very present. It begins with the apartness experienced in child-
hood. Then adolescence. Then adulthood. It seeps into the cracks exposed 
in the shame that that apartness often provokes (Downs 2012). 
My own childhood was defined by a looming presence of death that was 
experienced as a pre-trauma, a catastrophe yet-to-come. I longed for death 
in order to avoid the catastrophe of having my queerness exposed. And 
death was always preferable to the shame that the exposure of my sexual-
ity would wreak on both my Self and my family. For many queer subjects 
death is thus a long-standing companion. Queer subjects do not have the 
privilege of resorting to a chthonic instinct, to move death to the earth, as 
death is so intimately tied to our fantasies. 
As well as a catastrophe yet-to-come, queer subjects may also experi-
ence death in the reverse. Death is no longer our wish-fulfilment but rather 
the wish-fulfilment of others. When my queerness was exposed to my 
father and I told him that I had always been queer, he responded: “I wish 
you had told me earlier. I would have thrown you to the sharks”. You get so 
accustomed to your own queer death fantasies that you are shocked when 
others verbalize the same fantasy back at you. But the shock does not lie in 
the words themselves but in the confirmation of the fantasy itself. Telling a 
queer subject that they would be better off dead simply confirms that their 
pre-trauma was not imagined but part of their lived experience of dark-
ness. The queer figure thus becomes the creature of darkness that needs 
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to surface to communicate their existence in the world of light (Burckett 
& Marinatos 2010, xvii). But it is difficult for light to penetrate when 
queer subjects are forced to constantly project the darker parts of their 
own nature (Fontelieu 2010: 152).
Fontelieu argues modern societies have sought to banish the state of 
darkness from our psychological systems and religions (2010: 152). She 
contends that in contemporary societies today, “only if the darker aspects 
of the personality are defeated does the transformation end in a better life” 
(2010: 152). But for queer subjects darkness is inescapable. We do not have 
the capacity to dream that a better life is possible by emerging into the 
light. We are perennially stuck between light and darkness. 
In his Cruising Utopia José Esteban Muñoz posits that “queerness is 
not yet here” (2009: 1). By this he meant that queerness is about a future 
potentiality and the “rejection of the here and now” (2009: 1). By setting 
up queerness as an ontological object of hope, a utopia, he underlined how 
queerness can be “distilled from the past and used to imagine a future” 
(2009: 1). It is perhaps because “we are not yet queer” that we lack a chthonic 
instinct (2009: 1). But if we agree with Munóz’s assertion that “queerness is 
always in the horizon” (2009: 11) then the queer figure can delight in pro-
voking both dread and hope, joy and despair. We might not have a chthonic 
instinct but our queer horizons provide us with the potential to radically 
re-engage with the darker parts of our own nature. Let there be light. Let 
there be darkness. We are the shadow. Your shadow. Us. 
Nicholas Manganas
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